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He came to us already laden with promise, those many years
ago. It was 1948. He was just under forty, and had come from his
native Germany to the United States not quite ten years earlier. For
the last four of those years he practiced with the outstanding firm
of Milbank, Tweed, Hope and Hadley in New York City. Before
that he clerked for one year for Chief Judge Irving Lehman of the
New York Court of Appeals and the following year served as the
confidential law clerk to all the judges of that court. These two
years yielded an exhilarating experience to which he often refers.
In 1941-1942, his final year at the Columbia Law School, he had
won the coveted post of Editor-in-Chief of that School's law review,
a remarkable achievement for anyone, but an exceptional honor
for a newcomer to this country. He had entered the United States
late in 1938, already a citizen by reason of his father's citizenship.
His first brief teaching in this country was of girls at the Dalton
School. They had, he says, the highest average pulchritude of any
class he ever taught.
He was born in Munich in 1909. His law studies took him to
the Universities of Geneva and Berlin; then in 1933 at the Univer-
sity of Munich he was granted his Doctor Juris summa cum laude,
after which he served as general counsel to a German banking
house. Thus, he brought to our faculty unique experiences as a
cosmopolitan jurist.
Through the years, professional brilliance was matched by
affectionate friendships. Professor Schlesinger and his charming
f William G. McRoberts Research Professor in the Administration of the Law,
Emeritus, Cornell University. A.B. 1917, Cornell University; J.D. 1922, Harvard Law
School. My wife and I wrote this sketch together.
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and gifted wife, with their delightful children, became a well-loved
part of the Cornell community. Now that the time has come when
he must retire from Cornell, we feel deeply saddened by the loss
which their going will create. For Professor Schlesinger is a warm
friend, an outstanding teacher, a loyal and beloved colleague.
One of the many enthusiasms that my wife and I share with
the Schlesingers is for Switzerland and the glories of its mountains.
Mountains and mountain-climbing have always been'a real part of
Rudi's life and inspiration. I recall with particular delight one visit,
during sabbaticals, that we made to the Schlesinger family when
they were at Wengen in the Swiss Alps. Before we had to leave, we
called a rump meeting of the Cornell Law Faculty and passed,
without dissent, a resolution that the formula for sabbaticals-one
year of sabbatical after six years of duty-should be reversed. I
remember that Dean Thoron raised his eyebrows when I reported
this action to him; fortunately, it was never put into effect.
Professor Schlesinger is an international lawyer of eminence;
his exhaustive scholarship is combined with an innovativeness that
is even more rare. He has broken new trails into the study of the
world's legal systems. From the first, his teaching has been out-
standing, stimulating and tinged with his engaging humor; it has
always commanded students' enthusiasm. But his excellent teach-
ing is only a part of a brilliant career. His more than forty books,
articles and reviews, in many languages, have been published in the
United States, in five European countries, and in Latin America.
To read his elegant, lucid English is a pleasure in itself. He has
lectured widely, and has chaired or taken part in conferences,
symposia, and round tables in various countries. In the United
States, he was a visiting professor at Columbia in 1952, at Utah for
one summer, and, most recently, in Spring Term 1974, at Hastings
Law School (California), whose faculty he will join permanently in
the fall of 1975.
The Carnegie Corporation gave him one of its rarely-granted
Reflective Fellowships which he enjoyed in 1962-1963, but he
worked far harder, I am told and I believe, than the name of that
grant would imply. He is also, of course, a member of many
professional and academic associations and societies.
Throughout the years, he has continued-no ivory tower
academic-some practice of transnational law. I recall his remark-
ing once that he had found that the first rule for such a practice




He once gave me the best lesson in jurisprudence I have ever
received. I had quoted to him Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes's
iconoclastic remark that general principles do not settle concrete
cases. He answered, "No, but they help." Those four words de-
lighted me, for they seemed to put everything in its place.
As a colleague he has always been deeply involved in this
School's activities, as well as in those of the University, which he
served from 1961 to 1966 as Faculty Trustee. He has been a wise
and shrewd counselor in meetings of the School's faculty and its
committees.
At one time, I served for a few months as acting dean of our
School. Much of that time had to be spent, I recall, in trying to
make it seem reasonable to Professor Schlesinger to resist the siren
calls of other institutions. Our success in that was no doubt the
greatest service I have ever rendered to Cornell.
Although he taught extensively in procedure, restitution, and
conflict of laws, his major interest, as already noted, has been in
world law-worldwide conflict of laws in a sense-and its multifari-
ous sources. This is reflected by the chair that he holds as the
William Nelson Cromwell Professor of International and Compara-
tive Law. He has worked devotedly for the improvement of the law
in many fields, having served long as a consultant to the New York
State Law Revision Commission and as a member of the Board of
Editors of the American Journal of Comparative Law. He was also a
member, from 1959 to 1966, of the United States Advisory Com-
mittee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure.
His casebook, Comparative Law: Cases-Text-Materials, has
been through three editions so far, the first in 1950, the second in
1959, and the third in 1970. It is a masterpiece in the organization
and coverage of the infinite complexities of this subject.' It is by far
the most popular casebook in its field.2 It stresses practical useful-
ness, though at no sacrifice of wide-ranging scholarship, and is so
useful that one reviewer said that he had used it as a practice
manual before beginning to use it for teaching. 3
Perhaps his crowning achievement was a project sometimes
called "common core research": his direction, administration, and
editing of a ten-year study by nine comparatists from various
1 Jones, Book Review, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 604 (1960) (review of second edition).
2 Juenger, Book Review, 19 AM. J. Com'. L 369, 369-70 (1971) (review of third
edition).




countries dealing with ten legal systems.4 The subject of their study
was the law of offer and acceptance as they combine to make
contracts in ten of the world's legal systems. The goal was more
than mere juxtaposition of statements of law; it was true compari-
son in detail and in depth.5 In this collaboration Professor
Schlesinger was engaged with experts who had grown up in diverse
legal systems. The work analyzes in depth both the similarities and
the differences in the law of offer and acceptance as they exist in
the systems studied. In two respects it was a momentous
"breakthrough"--to borrow the word popular in the natural sci-
ences.
First, it brought together not only laws, as comparatists had
always done, but men; and the men educated one another,
through extensive correspondence and long working sessions in
Ithaca. The premise was that no scholar, however scholarly, can
understand au fond a system of law in which he has not been
reared. He often thinks he can; but in truth he can not. As
Professor Otto Kahn-Freund, of Oxford, put it in reviewing this
book:
A legal scholar -of great eminence and well-deserved interna-
tional reputation many years ago confessed to the present re-
viewer that whenever he dealt with a system of law other than
the one in which he had been trained, he felt like a burglar in a
strange house. Here, in the case of the Schlesinger team, no one
had to move in a strange house, except as a guest shown around
by the owner of the house who took him by the hand and acted
as his host. The value of this type of international cooperation is
that it involves a large measure of mutual education. This educa-
tion is bound to have, and had, in fact, three aspects: it helped
the members of the group to understand. the legal systems that
were represented by the other members; it helped them to
sharpen the tools of their own comparative techniques, but, as
always with comparative research, it also gave them a much
better understanding of their own law. In the reviewer's opinion,
this last point is of special importance. Not only did, as Professor
Schlesinger says, "every participant come away from the Ithaca
sessions with new ideas regarding his own legal system"--this was
to be expected-but the questions asked in the National Reports
[which set forth the law of the particular systems] were, in some
cases, "new" to the legal system under discussion, or at any rate
4 R. SCHLESINGER, FORMATION OF CoNTRATs-A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL
SYSTEMS, by P. Bonassies, G. Gorla, J. Leyser, W. Lorenz, I. Macneil (of the Cornell Law
School Faculty), K. Neumayer, I. Saxena, R. Schlesinger and W. Wagner, General Editor, R.
Schlesinger (1968) [hereinafter cited as FORMATION OF CONTRACTS].
5 Id. at 2-3 & nn.1-3.
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"new" to it in the particular context, and were suggested by one
of the other legal systems, compared by the team. One can easily
see how this happened; one can almost reconstruct the dialogues
which led to its happening. We all know the "unexpected"
question a foreigu observer is apt to ask about a legal system with
which we claim to be familiar, and how that question may
illumine our thinking. This intellectual, process-the result of
team work-is traceable throughout the b6ok.6
The second major innovation was the method used for con-
sulting the experts about their own laws: putting the questions to
them, in the first instance, not in the language of law but in the
language of facts-a method so usual in examining students but so
novel in examining eminent colleagues from other countries. The
chosen facts rested on actual cases. The language of law entered
the study at a later stage.
This procedure was time-consuming, involving almost ten
years of study; face-to-face conferences, exchanges of writings,
editing, and final writing. It was also expensive, and would not
have been possible but for a generous grant from the Ford Foun-
dation.
The ten main systems of law included in the project, in
alphabetical order, are: American, Australian-Canadian-New Zea-
land, Communist Legal Systems, English, French, German-Swiss-
Austrian, Indian, Italian, Polish, and South African. The omission
of the Spanish and Portuguese systems is due to an unfortunate
accident, a last-minute withdrawal, for medical and family reasons,
by the expert. The failure to include detailed analyses of Egyptian
and Islamic law was due, again, to an appointment of the Egyptian
expert to high government office, compelling him to drop out.7
The volumes are organized in an ingenious and useful manner.
The General Reports8 distill the findings on the twenty-six issues
treated (as parts of offer and acceptance) into a single compendi-
ous statement. The Individual Reports (or National Reports)9 on the
particular systems give the details of each system's treatment of
these twenty-six issues, arranged by subject. Thus the reader in-
terested, for example, in the law on acceptance by silence in
6 Kahn-Freund, Book Review, 18 AM. J. CoMP. L. 429, 434 (1970). Other reviews and
articles are also broadly illuminating. 1 do not intend to slight them, but 1 draw heavily on
this one because it is so succinct and so perceptive. (It contains some adverse criticisms too.)
7 FORMATION OF CONTRACTS 20-30.
8 Id. at 69-182.
9 Id. at 191-1693.
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various parts of the world can find it, by use of the index and
key-numberings, in a single section for each legal system.
The project succeeded. The "common cores" of agreement
were greater than had been anticipated. Not only were they iden-
tified, but their boundaries and extents were mapped. This was a
new achievement in comparative law, in which one or two men
usually juxtapose two or three legal systems, with far less detailed
comparison than became possible here. The usual semantic
difficulties, along with the problems spawned by the Tower of
Babel, were avoided or at least lessened. And, mirabile dictu, the
General Reports, setting forth the group's conclusions on the
twenty-six issues, were substantially unanimous.
Professor Kahn-Freund comments:
All comparative lawyers assume the existence of the "com-
mon core"--or else they would have to give up their work-but
as far as the present reviewer can see no one has, up till now,
segregated for investigation a limited area of law, put it, as it
were, under the microscope, and tabulated the data from which
the extent of the "common core" can be inferred. 10
If Nobel prizes were awarded to jurists, I am confident that
Professor Schlesinger would be a Nobel laureate.
The subject-specifically the mechanics, or external manifesta-
tions of consent, needed to form a contract-was chosen partly
because of its inescapable legal importance in international sales
and other contracts, and partly because of current efforts to unify
its pertinent legal rules." After the authors' ten years of labor, "the
participants ... asked themselves," as Professor Schlesinger puts it,
"the agonizing question often prompted by social science research:
did we merely demonstrate the obvious?"'12
The generally favorable reviews 13 by comparatists and transna-
tional lawyers answer this "agonizing question" strongly in the
negative. I have sampled this literature. Although I am not myself
qualified to give an independent expert judgment, the literature
convinces me that the study is indeed of first importance. There
are, to be sure, differences in the degrees of the reviewers' en-
thusiasm. But I believe that Professor Kahn-Freund must be cor-
10 Kahn-Freund, supra note 6, at 429.
1 FORMATION OF CONTRACTS 17-20.
12 Id. at 41.
13 A list of 19 reviews and review articles noted through May 15, 1969 appears in 2




rect when he concludes: "All comparative lawyers, indeed all
lawyers sans epith~te, are indebted to Professor Schlesinger and his
colleagues for their enormous and fruitful labor, and for the
maguificent contribution to comparative law which they have pre-
sented.
14
As in basic research in the natural sciences, the innovator can
rarely foresee what the eventual uses of his invention will be. 5 The
purposes envisaged by the team were: improvement of tools for
teaching the future transnational lawyer; 16 refinement of the
concept of "general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions" for greater usefulness to the International Court of Justice,
to international organizations, and to persons involved in interna-
tional trade, investments, and arbitration proceedings; and, lastly,
assistance in the development of national laws. I7
For these purposes to be achieved a vast amount of work will
continue to be required. Nine men needed ten years to cover ten
systems, on a subject narrowly limited to the mechanics of offer
and acceptance, and excluding other requisites for completing
contracts such as consideration (or causa) and the absence of fraud,
duress, illegality or other defects.' In Thompson's Williston on Con-
tracts,19 this same subject occupies less than one eightieth of the
treatise, and contracts itself is only one subject among hundreds.
Much time, effort, and money will thus be needed to complete this
kind of contribution to the bulk of the general principles of law
recoguized by civilized nations. Assuming that the requisite army
of researchers will devote themselves to such efforts, and that they
will have the skills of the team who worked on the Cornell project,
will the funds be available to move such an army about the world
for conferences?
Another consideration: although the "common core" was found
to be substantial in offer and acceptance, is there reason to suppose
that in areas more closely linked to social policy the results will be
similar?20 Only the future can tell.
I do not believe that these difficulties detract from the impor-
14 Kahn-Freund, supra note 6, at 441.
15 Professor Schlesinger makes this point in the Introduction to FORmATION OF CON-
TRACTS 5.
16 Id. at 5-7.
17 Id. at 7-20.
x FORMATION OF CONTRACTS, Part I, Scope Note II, IIA, IIB.2, at 71-72.
'9 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (2d ed. G. Thompson 1936) (82 pages out of 6611).
20 See Kahn-Freund, supra note 6, at 430-31. Kahn-Freund points out that the "com-
mon core" consists of techniques rather than of legal policies or purposes, that every legal
problem looks both toward the past of tradition and the future of policy, and that the
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tance of the work. A new tool has been invented and new pos-
sibilities have been opened. Future scholars must face the task of
using the tool and realizing the possibilities.
Professor Schlesinger has no illusions about the intractability
of the obstacles to a world rule of law: the twin evils of violence and
of maldistribution of wealth. He says in his Introduction:
It is not claimed, of course, that common core research is a
panacea which by itself will lead to a full flowering of the rule of
law in international relations. The biggest and thorniest of the
problems in this area-especially those related to actual or
threatened aggression, and to the present maldistribution of
wealth and skills-usually cannot be solved by the mere applica-
don of existing law. We label these problems as political rather
than legal for the very reason that their peaceful resolution will
require the creation, through patient negotiations, of new agree-
ments, programs and institutions.... It does not follow, however,
. . . that "an academic research project in comparative law" can
make no contribution at all to the solution of the big problems.
Without a basic store of shared notions and principles in the law
of transactions and of procedure, it will be most difficult to
negotiate, to draft and to implement the instruments that will
mark future progress in international relations. An endeavor to
add to that basic store, and to enhance the reliability of its
components, thus appears to be a necessary concomitant of such
progress. 21
If such progress is to come, everything promoting "a basic
store of shared notions and principles" will be of crucial value. This
is the world's best hope, no doubt. If rational cooperation can ever
bring forth "new ... institutions" with the strength and influence
needed for controlling aggressive centers of power and greed, then
our present fears may give way to confidence.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes put this hope well when he
said:
I think it not improbable . . . that man, like the grub that
prepares a chamber for the winged thing it never has seen but is
to be-that man may have cosmic destinies that he does not
understand. And so beyond the vision of battling races and an
impoverished earth I catch a dreaming glimpse of peace. 22
Such a peace must come if we are not to perish. If it does,
Professor Schlesinger's labors are more likely to have contributed
to it than those of any generals or those of most statesmen.
narrow subject of offer and acceptance was chosen-quite correctly and wisely--because it is
"ethically, socially, politically, near the point of absolute indifference." In other areas of the
law the "common core" might well be smaller.
21 FORMATION oF CoNTRAcrs 11-12 (emphasis in original).
22 S. BENT, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs 354 (1932).
